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Abstract
As this paper argues, chance is the key defining 
aspect of film, distinguishing it from other forms of 
art and communication. This is because film has 
the ability to capture a direct, mechanical imprint of 
the unpredictable movement of reality as a series 
of equidistant static images. Through the enhanced 
visibility (such as the close-up or slow-motion) and re-
playability of this static state, film can reveal contingent 
nuances of this movement. Therefore, film can be 
seen as uniquely positioned on a semiotic threshold 
between movement and stillness – the infinitely 
complex movement of the real, and the conceptual 
stillness of language – translating randomness and 
chaos into aleatory significance, or revealing the 
unpredictable, contingent foundation of seemingly 
ordinary, habitual events.
On the basis of a creative synthesis of particular 
aspects of the philosophy and theory of Bergson, 
Deleuze, Barthes and others, this paper sets out chance 
as the defining semiotic aspect of film. Furthermore, 
the paper discusses and presents outcomes of a 
practice research in film, which used this theoretical 
synthesis as a rationale for practical exploration and 
experimentation – establishing chance as a significant 
expressive tool and aesthetic element of film practice. 
In this way, the paper presents new filmmaking methods 
uniquely rooted in film philosophy, while contributing to 
the expansion of the understanding of the nature of film 
and to the narrative/stylistic potential of cinema art.
Keywords: Chance, Semiotics, Experimental, Film 
Ontology, Bergson
Introduction 
Chance (or contingency), as this paper argues, 
is a unique expressive aspect of film, which has a 
significant potential for film practice. My understanding 
of film is that it represents a threshold between the 
unpredictable becoming of reality and the conceptual 
stillness of human language and intellect. While film is 
(ontologically) a still structure made out of equidistant 
photographs, it captures a mechanical imprint of 
(something of) the movement of reality – namely, the 
movement/becoming of the particular arrangement 
of light in the moment of photographic capture. This 
captured moment usually has dominant coherent and 
meaningful aspects intended by the filmmaker: it is 
an image of something or someone, taken for some 
reason and in a certain context – such as in the context 
of a narrative film production. However, because of the 
indiscriminate automatism of the camera technology, 
an entire visual point in reality becomes captured within 
the de-limitation of the frame, which can contain various 
unintentional, aleatory elements, especially in situations 
where a great complexity of movement in reality is 
concerned. Due to the permanent nature of film, and 
its potential to generate enhanced visibility (such as 
through the close-up shot or slow motion), the aleatory 
aspects in reality can coincide within the still structure 
to generate a sense of semiotic significance. This 
sense of significance, as I argue, ultimately relies on 
the persisting tension between movement and stillness 
in film: film is a still, semiotic structure but it also gives 
us a privileged view of movement. This understanding 
of film was developed through a theoretical synthesis 
of particular writings of Barthes, Bergson, Deleuze and 
others, which I elaborate on in detail in the following 
section. However, this synthesis had also inspired 
and informed the formulation of a set of practical 
methods, which generated experimental filmmaking 
outcomes that to an extent illustrate the theory but also 
provide a certain non-rational insight into the particular 
understanding of film. Furthermore, the presented 
examples of practice operate as documentation of the 
kind of creative/artistic results that can be obtained 
through methodical (and methodological) pursuit 
of chance in filmmaking, as directly informed and 
influenced by the underlying theory. 
As the related theorical and practical investigations 
equally suggest, a direct encounter with contingent 
reality is possible in film whenever unconstructed 
reality can enter the frame, no matter what kind of 
film it is. This aspect of the becoming of reality is 
nevertheless ordinarily assimilated into film’s coherent 
signification as narrative or a message that is being 
communicated. However, the element of chance can 
contribute to the destabilisation of the coherence 
of the image – it can contribute to a rupture of a 
coherent narrative signification and of a coherent 
representation of the filmed reality. If the aim of a film 
is to communicate a message or a story, then such 
intrusion of unintentional chance would usually end up 
on the cutting floor – as an undesirable mistake – and 
rarely it would find its way into the film. It is usually in 
art and experimental films where chance is recognised 
as a valuable contribution to the artistic impression of 
the film and deliberately included in its structure (there 
are many notable examples of this, such as in films 
of Stan Brakhage, Michelangelo Antonioni or William 
Greaves; however, elaborating on these examples in 
sufficient detail is beyond the scope of this paper). My 
practice nevertheless focused primarily on the ways in 
which chance can be captured and creatively utilised 
in film, using methods such as filming continuously 
(often with multiple cameras), so that unexpected 
moments of chance could unintentionally occur and 
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could be subsequently discovered in the large quantity 
of footage obtained. Furthermore, the value of the 
practical outcomes lies in the fact that, as a practitioner, 
I can clearly account for the unintentional origin of 
the aleatory aspects of the image. This is critical, 
as, although I would posit that the expressive value 
of chance cannot be successfully staged or faked, 
we ultimately cannot be certain of the exact origin of 
images in film works where we don’t have access to a 
transparent account of the production process. 
Nevertheless, as I allude to earlier, the philosophical/
conceptual understanding of the unique expressive 
potential of chance in film preceded this practice 
and was in fact critical to both the framing and the 
interpretation of the practice. The understanding of 
film as a threshold between movement and stillness 
– being, in a fundamental sense, both moving and 
still at the same time – had a decisive impact on my 
practitioner positioning toward the process of filming 
and in that sense directly inspired and informed the 
creative process. It is therefore important to establish 
in detail the theoretical framework before presenting 
the outcomes of the practice. 
Movement/Stillness: Bergson, Barthes and 
Deleuze
In Henri Bergson’s philosophy, the concepts of 
becoming and duration are fundamentally related, to 
the extent that they are in opposition (or in hierarchical 
supremacy) to abstract/geometrical space, and to 
individual objects moving through this geometrical space 
according to divisible, reversible time. These secondary, 
conceptual kinds of movement and time represent 
the way in which the human intellect understands 
and views the world. As Bergson (1944) points out, 
‘we become unable to perceive the true evolution, 
the radical becoming. Of becoming we perceive only 
states, of duration only instants, and even when we 
speak of duration and of becoming, it is of another 
thing that we are thinking’ (297). However, for Bergson 
(2002) the true nature of reality ‘is global and undivided 
growth, progressive invention, duration: it resembles a 
gradually expanding rubber balloon assuming at each 
moment unexpected forms’ (226); reality, for Bergson, 
is the ‘flow of unforeseeable novelty … the moving 
originality of things’ (232). Or as Ronald Bogue (2003) 
puts it, ‘for Bergson the universe is a vibrational whole, 
various entities being diverse contractions and dilations 
of durée, and that vibrational whole may be thought of 
(with due caution) as time-space or matter-flow – that 
is, as universal movement, in which there is no division 
between motion and things moving’ (32). Bergson’s 
(2002) concept of duration reflects ‘the continuity of 
real time’ (211), as opposed to ‘spatialised time’, and is 
fundamentally related to consciousness; as he affirms, 
‘we cannot speak of a reality that endures without 
inserting consciousness into it’ (207). However, the 
aspect of his philosophy more aligned with becoming 
– yet also fundamentally related to duration – which 
reflects ‘the perpetual flux of things’ (1944, 344), ‘the 
continuity of the real movement’ (377), is more useful 
to my ontological approach to film. As a practitioner, 
when I deal with the unpredictable unfolding of reality 
in the moment of filming, it is the aspect of movement 
that ushers in the radical novelty and chance in reality. 
Furthermore, making aesthetic decisions about the 
creative process, including the experience of working 
with the film material in post-production, makes the 
ontological stillness of film a methodological given. 
Therefore, negotiating movement and stillness 
(and creatively utilising the potential that arises at 
their intersection) is a critical aspect of the practice. 
Significantly, however, it is the understanding of 
movement and stillness rooted in Bergson’s philosophy 
that is at stake: real movement (becoming) and human, 
conceptual stillness (meaning) – and film as a threshold 
between the two.
As I allude to in the introduction, in order for the 
becoming of the real (as Bergson understands it) to 
register on film as something noticeable, this trace 
of the becoming of the real has to stand in marked 
distinction to the film’s intentional and controlled 
communication. This is precisely what I mean by 
chance, by contingency: something specific and 
noticeable that happens – and is registered on film – 
without anyone intending or planning for it to happen. 
In her discussion of early cinema (and especially the 
documentary-style ‘actualities’ from the early 20th 
century), Mary Ann Doane (2002) points out film’s 
unique ability to capture contingency – to capture 
the ‘immediacy of the real’, the ‘pure present’ (151). 
She claims that ‘the specificity of photography as a 
representational form has been, and continues to be, 
situated as a privileged link to the contingent’ (142). 
In other words, she identifies film’s specificity – its 
undiscriminating viewpoint – as the key aspect of 
its ability to capture contingency. For contingency 
ultimately testifies to the unpredictable complexity of 
the becoming of the real, transcending human intention 
and control. However, the aleatory origin of a moving 
image in the unpredictable becoming of reality can 
either be accounted for or it can merely be assumed. 
While reading for contingency in cinema has to usually 
rely on the latter, the production of new film work 
allows for an enhanced insight into the emergence of 
the image, and hence into the degree of intentionality 
and control that was involved. What is more, certain 
experimental methods can be implemented, which aim 
to maximise the element of chance in the film material 
(I outline these in the following section). 
Chance in cinema ultimately exist within, and 
emerges from, the ontological stillness of film as a series 
of static frames. And, indeed, both still photography 
and film have the propensity to capture chance, and 
there is, therefore, an important, ontological identity 
between still photography and film. After all, even a still 
photograph requires a certain time to be exposed, so 
perhaps the difference is in the extent of duration of 
real movement preserved, rather than an ontological 
difference between movement and stillness as 
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such. Certainly, the duration of film gives a radically 
enhanced impression of real movement, but perhaps 
that is not so much a qualitative such as a quantitative 
difference (at least from the ontological perspective). 
What is much more important, I would argue, is that in 
either case real movement is preserved and contained 
as still. Still, not in the superficial sense that it doesn’t 
appear to be moving – as is self-explanatory in the 
case of a photograph – but rather still in line with 
Bergson’s (2002) philosophy: ‘unwinding a roll ready 
prepared’ (177), always there in an identical sequential 
order, always ready to be re-played, always ready to 
be read. In this regard, both film and photography are 
inherently semiotic – always opened up to semiosis as 
a text – however, not in the sense that they necessarily 
have to represent something already specific and 
intelligible, but rather that new representational 
links can be invented, discovered, agreed upon, 
and even, intuited or felt. Film is always there, as a 
static, objectively verifiable audio/visual sequence and 
structure, and yet, as Mullarkey (2009) points out, in 
relation to Bergson, ‘the new can only be felt’ (211, 
emphasis in the original). Therefore, the unexpected 
or unintentional expression of chance as always new 
and singular – never following a predefined pattern 
or a code driven by habit, intention or intelligible 
communication of meaning – can perhaps only be read 
in the stillness of the images on the level of feeling 
and intuition. This level nevertheless ‘overcomes the 
duality of rationalism and emotivism’ (211) as affect (I 
explain what I mean by affect later on in this section).  
In ‘The Third Meaning’ (1977a, 52–68), Roland 
Barthes outlines precisely this kind of loose semiotic 
connection, which fundamentally depends on the 
contingent alignment of the real within a photographically 
captured frame. He studies closely particular still 
images taken from a feature film, which leads him 
to distinguish three layers of meaning: the first is an 
informational level (this is the level of communication, 
the story, the message of the film); the second is a level 
of symbolism (this is a semiotic level beyond message, 
but nevertheless lucid and intentional; it is composed 
of various symbolic elements readable for a clearly 
identifiable and justifiable signified, whilst applying the 
fields of knowledge such as psychoanalysis, economy 
and dramaturgy); the third level then contains the 
third meaning.
The third meaning appears to Barthes as a surplus 
of meaning, a certain insistence of the image after all 
intelligible meaning has been extracted from it: he can 
describe in detail the various aspects of the signifier, 
without being able to (linguistically) grasp the signified 
– it bears a significance, without signifying anything. It 
is ‘at once persistent and fleeting, smooth and elusive 
… appears to extend outside culture, knowledge and 
information … opening out into the infinity of language 
… indifferent to moral or aesthetic categories’ (54–
55). The third meaning is unintentional, hidden away 
under the layer of obvious symbolism and ‘carries a 
certain emotion’ (59, emphasis in the original). The 
third meaning subverts and surpasses the story of the 
film – through its insistence and significance – and 
therefore represents the filmic: the visual, which is 
unique and peculiar to film, outside of narrative and 
traditional meaning; a ‘representation which cannot be 
represented’ (64).
It is quite paradoxical that the true essence of film 
should be expressed exclusively through a still image, 
and Barthes is aware of this paradox. He nevertheless 
cannot help but seeing the ‘filmic time’ as a constraining 
obstacle, preventing the third meaning from asserting 
itself in motion. Furthermore, he insists that the still 
‘is not a specimen chemically extracted from the 
substance of the film, but rather the trace of a superior 
distribution of traits of which the film as experienced 
in its animated flow would give no more than one text 
among others’ (67, emphasis in the original). However, 
Barthes’ description of the third meaning is perfectly 
consistent with the expression of chance in film, and 
in fact, I would argue it is precisely the traces of real 
movement which are reflected in the still image for 
Barthes: on the threshold between real movement and 
film’s ontological stillness. 
What is more, the illusion of movement in film 
imbues film with a sense of living duration, as its time 
has to coincide with the becoming of reality each time 
it is being re-played. That gives film a sense of its own 
becoming, independent of the activity of the mind of 
the viewer. The significance that Barthes recognises 
in the photograph only endures in the mind; whereas 
film endures in its own right, producing its own sense 
of internal vision, stirring the traces of real movement 
in new contexts, becoming with reality anew. This 
corresponds with Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari’s 
(1994) understanding of affects in works of art as 
independent of both the viewer and the creator, as the 
‘nonhuman becomings of man’ (169, emphasis in the 
original): they exist independently of the human being 
as a subject – they exist as ‘sensible experiences in 
their singularity, liberated from organising systems of 
representation’ (Colebrook 2001, 22). Furthermore, 
the power of cinema, for Deleuze, lies precisely in its 
ability to create new realities, new affects, rather than 
representing specific things as perceived in reality. 1
The concept of affect in film represents, I argue, 
precisely the point of contact between the real and the 
image, the point at which the real becomes imprinted 
on the image as a kind of trace: an echo of real 
movement. At the same time, the tension between 
these echoes of real movement and film’s ontological 
stillness persists in film. One way of understanding this 
tension between movement and stillness is to think of 
it as overtonal resonance 2 – a secondary, collateral 
vibration of the various elements of the moving-still 
structure of the film. Overtonal resonance can be 
understood as a complex, unpredictable resonance 
that transcends the distinction between dissonance 
and consonance. As the still structure of film becomes 
animated through movement, the echoes of real 
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movement start to resonate within this structure; they 
come alive, so to speak. Overtonal resonance, in 
this sense, is precisely the aspect of becoming in 
the film – as it is being played – that differentiates it 
from its ontological state as a series of static frames, 
without ever entirely negating this static nature. On 
the contrary, it is precisely the static nature of film that 
can give rise to overtonal resonance once it is brought 
to life through playback or projection (although it can 
likewise give rise to jarring, avant-garde dissonance, 
or consonant narrative engagement and satisfaction). 
The stillness of film can imbue the captured 
chance with significance, as Barthes describes it; but 
this significance is continuously animated within the 
moving-still structures of film, which makes it take on 
a more autonomous function within the film as affect. 
The expression of chance in film is therefore not the 
meaning of inter-subjective human communication, 
but a nonhuman exchange between the real and the 
moving-still, virtual-yet-permanent field of the moving 
image. In other words, in the shadow of human 
intention and communication, chance can imbue film 
with a sense of nonhuman intention and significance, 
which can be read or understood as affect.
The Implementation of Chance in 
Experimental Film Practice
As I explain earlier, the synthesis of film theory and 
philosophy elaborated on in the previous section formed 
a specific basis for film practice experimentation. The 
aim of the practice was to produce instances in film 
where the element of unpredictable reality creates an 
expressive sense of significance, similar to how Barthes 
defines his third meaning but also fundamentally linked 
to movement and affect. Or rather, the expressive 
potential of chance is linked to a marked tension 
between movement and stillness in film, which I refer 
to as overtonal resonance. The methods employed 
in the process of production were primarily oriented 
toward creating conditions in which the opportunities 
for ‘significant chance’ to registerer on film could be 
maximised. The underlying practitioner approach was 
to generate an excessive amount of footage and to 
record continuously without making regular decisions 
about when to start or stop recording – decisions about 
what is and is not valuable to capture. This method was 
one of the ways in which conscious intention could be 
suspended, but it was also building on the fundamental 
duality between movement and stillness explained in 
the previous section. In the moment of filming, I was 
aware of the function of the camera as a kind of portal 
between the unpredictable becoming of reality and the 
permanent stillness of all the recorded images. Rather 
than making decisions about what to film, how to film it 
and what the purpose of this process is, the approach 
was to absorb indiscriminately the surrounding flow of 
reality, while also being an inherent part of this flow. 
Therefore, instead of planning ahead of time, I focused 
on filming in environments with a strong sense of flux, 
where a lot happens and changes, while increasing 
this sense of flux in the images by being constantly 
on the move with the camera. Ultimately, in order for 
chance to create a sense of significance in film – as 
overtonal resonance – there has to be an element 
of visual movement involved, which gives rise to a 
tension between the echoes of real movement and 
the still, semiotic permanence of the series of static 
frames. Therefore, the decision was to maximise the 
opportunities for unpredictable movement of both the 
camera and the surrounding environment.
The filming process consisted of passing through 
busy urban environments – without intending to get to or 
arrive at anywhere particular – while constantly filming 
and while following one or two performers, so that the 
focus of the camera was not oriented toward anyone not 
wishing to participate in the film. Furthermore, the human 
body itself can create a marked sense of echoes of real 
movement and be a source of contingency (as some 
of the examples below illustrate). Elena Del Río (2008) 
identifies film as a ‘privileged medium for the exhibition 
of bodies’ (10). In film, Del Río explains, ‘whatever 
happens to a body becomes instantly available to 
perception. Thus, the performing body presents itself as 
a shock wave of affect, the expression-event that makes 
affect a visible and palpable materiality’ (10). She sees 
performance to be the source of the real (movement) in 
film, the aspect that disrupts film’s narrative or formal 
structuring tendencies: ‘as an event, performance is cut 
off from any preconceived, anterior scenario or reality. 
In its fundamental ontological sense, performance gives 
rise to the real’ (4). Dieter Mersch (2012) then claims 
that the presence of the body within the still structures 
of film leads to an ‘enhanced visibility, concurrent with 
a never-before-seen manifestation of the human body’ 
(448). This enhanced visibility can be achieved in film by 
both the close-up shot and slow motion, and I employed 
both techniques in the practice, in order to maximise the 
potential of chance to generate significant expression as 
overtonal resonance. For Walter Benjamin (2008), the 
close-up ‘brings to light entirely new structures of matter’ 
while ‘slow motion not only reveals familiar aspects 
of movements, but discloses quite unknown aspects 
within them’ (37). Through the revelatory power of the 
close-up and slow motion, as Benjamin suggests, film 
gives rise to the ‘optical unconscious’ – a term which is 
compatible with Deleuze’s ‘nonhuman affects’ produced 
outside of human control or intention. Furthermore, 
the close-up is also critical to Jean Epstein’s (1977) 
‘photogénie’, which opens up ‘the cinematic feeling’ (16) 
in the film. Photogénie is therefore compatible with my 
understanding of nonhuman affects resulting from the 
expression of chance through the overtonal resonance 
between movement and stillness.
As some the following examples illustrate, the 
close-up and slow-motion techniques contributed to 
the production of what I argue is a sense of overtonal 
resonance – resulting from an element of chance 
being trapped in the still structures of film. While I 
cannot factually evidence the semiotic effect of chance 
giving rise to nonhuman affects – and in that sense 
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my description is merely an interpretation, similar to 
Barthes’ account of the third meaning in a still image – I 
am nevertheless able to comment, as a practitioner, on 
the origin of the images in terms of what was intentional 
and what was not. I present the visual examples as a 
left-to-right sequence of a few frames removed from 
each shot in question. While this does not give the 
reader full access to the overtonal resonance initiated 
by movement, it nevertheless brings attention to the 
still, semiotic permanence of film. This presentation 
therefore puts an emphasis on the fact that it is 
ultimately a sequential structure of still photographs that 
carries the affective expression, rather than a single, 
isolated frame removed from the film, as is the case 
with Barthes’ interpretation of the third meaning.
Examples of the Practical Outcomes
While continuously filming on locations around 
London, I obtained a long Steadicam shot following a 
performer along a busy London Underground platform. 
(Image 1) The human figures passing along and 
against the flow of the camera are out of focus, due 
to the narrow depth of field of the camera focused on 
the back of the performer. This visual softness helps 
to emancipate the image from an ordinary sense of 
reality but does not take away from the serendipitous 
alignment of movement in the situation: as the camera 
makes a sweeping motion to the left, a woman runs 
by, her reflection caught in the glass wall separating 
the platform from the tracks. As she passes the frame, 
the train doors close, and the train begins to depart, 
coinciding with the fast-paced progression of the 
camera forward and the continuous flow of people 
in both directions. This wholly un-staged moment in 
time occurred just once, in absolute singularity – the 
contingent echo of real movement captured and stilled, 
creating a moving-still expressive structure.
Image 1
they send ripples of air, and the backlight illuminates 
individual hair oscillating in the rapid vortex forming 
around the performer’s head. The wind coincides with 
a slight swaying of the camera, perhaps contributing to 
it. The advance of the two trains, the wind, the pulsating 
camera, and the stirring eyes of the performer intently 
following the passing carriages in front of her all coincide 
to create a sense of unified movement, as if the whole 
image was pulsating with a single in-and-out breathing 
motion, synchronised to the living, heart-beating 
presence of the performer to the camera and to her 
immediate environment – the pressurised becoming of 
the real. Suddenly, an electric discharge on the roof of 
the left-side train briefly sparks into the night, to further 
illuminate the singularity of this contingent moment in 
time, now solidified (and discovered/delimited) in the 
digital film as an echo of real movement, expressing 
nonhuman affects as significance.
Image 2
In a different example (Image 2), a performer stands 
on an outdoor platform, when two London Underground 
trains arrive at the same time on both sides of her. This 
was not planned or staged, but just happened in the 
moment of filming; we were merely waiting to board 
the train, and the centre-framing of the performer was 
intuitive, based on the immediate circumstances. The 
fact of the two trains simultaneously arriving, as well 
as the back illumination of the performer created by 
the lamp right above her, was only ‘discovered’ in 
the editing room. As the trains burst into the platform 
In another moment, a performer stood in front of a 
doorway between the underground train carriages; the 
intense air blowing through the small window in the door 
makes her hair swirl around. (Image 3) This complex 
movement is complicated further by the camera with 
fixed focus and shallow depth of field making slight, 
gliding adjustments back and forth, creating a sense 
of fluid oscillation between image softness and points 
of focus – especially the alternating focus on the 
performer’s hair and her face. Here, therefore, the 
close-up framing is employed to bring attention to the 
unpredictable complexity of the movement of the hair, 
which is initiated by the aleatory passage of air through 
the train carriage. The camera movement contributes to 
this complex structure of movement, in order to create 
a singular arrangement of unpredictable complexity 
that carries nonhuman affects, and the origin of which 
is primarily defined by chance. 
Image 3
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An additional method of maximising the opportunities 
for chance to register on film was the use of a 
custom-designed shoulder rig with two cameras mounted 
side-by-side. This meant that I could only operate one 
of the cameras at a time, so that the second camera 
filmed ‘unconsciously’ (without my continuous control 
over what and how it was filming), with its particular 
movement and framing resulting from my attendance to 
the other camera. However, one specific shot emerged 
when following a performer toward a filming location, 
while not temporarily attending to either of the cameras. 
Both cameras were nevertheless recording, and one of 
them accidentally captured a shot that, due to the use 
of slow motion, forged a captivating visual structure, 
possessing an expression relatable to both Deleuze’s 
nonhuman affects and Barthes’ significance of the third 
meaning. (Image 4) The slow motion smoothened the 
wild jumps caused by my steps – here emphasised by 
using a macro lens at an extended focal length, which, 
on the other hand, resulted in reduced depth of field of 
the image (increased softness). The low depth of field, 
combined with the random, slowed-down motion of the 
camera, and the singular movements of the performer 
(revealed and amplified through the slow motion), here 
produced a strong sense of aleatory significance in the 
moving-still structure of the shot. 
Image 4
within the still structure of film – having the potential 
for rupture to the coherent, meaningful, communicative 
strand of the film, similar to Barthes’ third meaning. 
This encounter of real movement and stillness – 
when animated through film’s illusory movement 
– can generate nonhuman affects (indeterminate, 
impersonal, singular feelings self-contained in the 
image), which can ultimately be considered a direct 
audio-visual expression of contingency unique to film.  
This theoretical synthesis and the generation of new 
concepts inspired and informed practice that aims to 
illuminate the expressive potential of film by utilising 
the inherent tension between movement and stillness, 
while using chance as a creative and structuring 
principle. Furthermore, the practice both illustrates and 
consolidates these concepts – entering into a creative 
dialogue with the underlying theory. The practical 
methods also represent new knowledge relevant to film 
practice and practice-as-research in film. My approach 
was informed by established methods of film production 
(primarily shaped by my practitioner knowledge, 
experience and education), but also by the specific aims 
of the project rooted in the fundamental, ontological 
aspects of film – especially film’s distinctive potential 
to capture and reveal contingency. These practitioner 
aims and considerations therefore have validity and 
applicability in the context of broader filmmaking, since 
all film production carries the opportunity to utilise the 
tools unique to the medium: not only to produce and 
communicate meaning, but to transcend meaning and 
communication – in a way only film is able to do. 
Conclusion 
The synthesis of the conceptual fields surrounding 
Bergson, Deleuze and Barthes represents an original 
scholarship in film theory, which is concerned with a 
particular audio-visual, semiotic effect of film produced 
by an overtonal resonance between contingent 
movement and film’s ontological stillness. Overtonal 
resonance, a term borrowed from Sergei Eisenstein, 
is essentially a complex, unpredictable resonance 
that transcends the distinction between dissonance 
(formal, avant-garde play) and consonance (seamless 
impression of reality and/or narrative engagement). 
The specific notion of movement (as opposed to 
film’s ontological stillness) is derived from Bergson’s 
philosophy and relates to the incessant emergence 
and becoming of reality (the real movement), which 
the human intellect can only perceive conceptually as 
stillness. The tension between this kind of movement 
and how it registers on film (due to its nonhuman, 
mechanical vision) can be understood as an echo of 
real movement, which represents the point where the 
contingent movement of the real becomes imprinted 
Final notes  
1 Steven Shaviro (2010) and Brian Massumi (2002), in their 
writings inspired by Deleuze, distinguish between affect and 
emotion, which is a helpful distinction when defining affect. 
Emotion is a specific and qualified experience of a subject, 
confining or reducing affect to an intelligible (human) form, 
which nevertheless always has a certain affective surplus 
beyond meaning and outside the boundaries of subjectivity 
(Shaviro 2010, 4).
2 I borrow the term ‘overtone’ from Sergei Eisenstein’s 
concept of ‘overtonal montage’, developed in his essay ‘Filmic 
Fourth Dimension’ (1949), who in turn borrows the term 
‘overtone’ from acoustics, and specifically from experimental 
orchestral music, where overtones – secondary, collateral 
vibrations of a dominant tone – are the ‘most significant means 
for affect’ (66). These visual overtones are experienced by the 
viewer, according to Eisenstein, on a ‘physiological level’, in the 
sense that perception is a ‘higher nervous activity’ than merely 
‘psychic’ processes: ‘in this way, behind the general indication 
of the shot, the physiological summary of its vibrations as a 
whole, as a complex unity of the manifestations of all its stimuli, 
is present. This is the peculiar “feeling” of the shot, produced 
by the shot as a whole’ (67, emphases in the original). More 
importantly, Eisenstein asserts that the visual (or musical) 
overtone cannot be perceived outside movement: it only 
emerges ‘in the dynamics of the musical or cinematographic 
process’ (69, emphasis in the original). Therefore, visual and 
aural overtones are of the same kind, of the same substance, 
belonging to the ‘fourth dimension’ of time (movement), which 
is the dimension of physiological sensation: the overtone is not 
heard or seen, but felt (70–1). 
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